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Abstract: The present work aims to highlight the impact 
that Synesius of Cyrene had on Ficino and Pico della 
Mirandola in the formation process of the Renaissance 
concept of rhetoric and the anthropology connected 
thereto. Special attention will be drawn to the close link 
between rhetoric and phantasia, both imaginative and cre-
ative forces that are present in all three authors. The mas-
ter of these forces is the rhetorician, who assumes in this 
respect an exemplary anthropological function. In fact, if 
on the one hand he is an ambiguous manipulator of shady 
speeches, on the other hand he is able to fully express the 
variety of human nature. This makes him an alter deus, 
that is, a demonic being whose nature is superior to any 
other. It is no accident that the demigod Proteus is a 
theme in all three authors and is the symbol of a positive 
human nature, which reveals itself as amphibious, multi-
ple and, above all, highly characterised on the verbal level 
and the imaginative level. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When thinking of Italian literature in the Renaissance, the 
first thought goes immediately to the extraordinary redis-
covery of the classics which characterised those centuries. 
However, it should not be forgotten that humanists medi-
ated the past using the cultural ‘lenses’ of Late Antiquity, 
especially in a first instance when many codices were not 
available nor Greek was as widespread. Late Antiquity is 
not only one last great moment of splendour for the pagan 
literary culture but also of elaboration of great classics 
which will influence their interpretation in the following 
centuries. When Plato is picked up again in the 15th cen-
tury, he is read via the eyes of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and 
Proclus, while Aristoteles is read via the eyes of Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias and Themistius.1 
Therefore, if we want to examine the renewed flour-
ishing of sophistry and ancient rhetoric in the Renais-
sance, focusing on Late Antiquity musings regarding 
these topics can unearth new interesting research. We ob-
serve a revival of sophistry in Late Antiquity: the debate 
between rhetoric and philosophy started by Plato and Is-
ocrates, taken up by the Second Sophistry between the 1st 
and 2nd century, thrives in the 4th century during the resto-
ration of paganism promoted by emperor Julian.2 
Among the intellectuals of the 4th century who influence 
the rhetoric and literature in the Renaissance, Synesius of 
Cyrene, a Neoplatonic rhetorician and philosopher be-
longing to school of Hypatia, could play a role which still 
has not been highlighted by modern studies. This contri-
bution aims to research if the originality of Synesius’ 
thought on rhetoric could have echoes on mainly a theo-
retical as well as textual level of Renaissance’s rhetoric 
and its anthropology, namely by analysing the thoughts of 
Marsilio Ficino and Pico Della Mirandola. After having 
briefly cleared Synesius’ position on the Late Antiquity 
debate on rhetoric, the paper will continue analysing dif-
ferent elements suggesting Synesius influenced the cho-
sen Renaissance authors by analysing the circulation of 
their texts, intertextuality, and the link between rhetoric 
and φαντασία/phantasia. As we will see, these authors 
share a specific sensibly towards the power of words and 
a deep faith towards its artifex: man.  
 
 
2. Synesius and the apology of rhetoric 
 
Synesius of Cyrene is known by Renaissance scholars 
mostly for his De insomnis, a treatise on oneiromancy, the 
interpretation and divination of dreams, a volume which 
was widespread in the Renaissance. The essay is import-
ant to Neoplatonism in the Renaissance as proved by the 
Latin translation prepared by Marsilio Ficino around 
1488:3 besides touching upon gnoseology and cosmology, 
he illustrates the traits and functions of φαντασία, man’s 
faculty of imagination which is also responsible for 
dreaming. However, Synesius is a philosopher, but first 
and foremost a rhetorician, as proved by some of his 
works: Cynegetica, lost to us but we know it had been 
criticised for its elegant language and playful nature (Ep. 
154.11-18);4 Calvitii encomium, an exercise in adoxogra-
phy and rhetoric virtuosity which mocks In Praise of Hair 
by Dio Chrysostom; and the Dion, a work where Synesius 
discusses the relation between philosophy and rhetoric 
and the epistemological nature of the latter. 
Dion is written around 405 AD to counteract e parte 
philosophorum criticisms to Synesius regarding his writ-
ing.5 He had been accused of being too rhetorically elabo-
rate compared to the severity demanded from philoso-
phers.6 Indeed, in Late Antiquity, a certain idea had 
spread identifying philosophy with silence, taking Plato’s 
condemnation of rhetoric in dialogues such as Euthyde-
mus, Gorgias, Sophist to an extreme: this had created an 
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overlap between the meaning of φιλόσοφος and 
μισόλογος (Ep. 154.6-7).7 In the Dion, Synesius however 
markedly takes his distance from those philosophers, 
“who despise rhetoric and poetry” (Οὗτοι καὶ 
ὑπερόπται ῥητορικῆς καὶ ποιήσεως; 5.3; Fitzgerald): 
 
Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφρονήσουσι, καὶ πρὸς θεωρίαν 
ἀτρύτως ἔχειν ἐροῦσιν, ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι ποιούμενοι, θεοὶ 
σαρκία περικείμενοι· εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, ἴστων ἀντὶ θεῶν ἢ 
σοφῶν τε καὶ θείων ἀνδρῶν χαῦνοι καὶ ἀλαζόνες πόρρω 
γενόμενοι (6.6). 
 
They do not surpass in knowledge their nature, though they will 
also profess an untiring zeal for contemplation, making them-
selves out to be passionless gods although clothed in flesh. Nay, 
if they were to make such profession, let them know that so far 
from being gods or wise and divine men, they are empty-
headed, and boasters into the bargain (Fitzgerald with adapta-
tions).8 
 
Synesius opposes this behaviour by defending the value 
of rhetoric as the most ideal and natural tool for man to 
express his multiplicity: it should be embraced and not 
interpreted as a limitation.9 Demanding to stay uninter-
ruptedly in the silence of noetic contemplation is a mysti-
fication of what should be a philosophical and spiritual 
exercise10. This must occur by understanding the nature of 
man, his median status and his dual polarity: a sensible 
and intelligible being (8.1), successively trying to “make 
the multitude into one” (ἓν τὸ πλῆθος ποιήσαντα; 5.1; 
Fitzgerald). This, however, must occur by exercising and 
expressing said multiplicity and not by negating part of it. 
As Synesius explains, this does not mean to “go down 
towards matter, neither dip the mind in the lowest pow-
ers” (οὐ βαθύνεται πρὸς ὕλην, οὐδὲ ἐμβαπτίζει 
τὸν νοῦν ταῖς ἐσχάταις δυνάμεσιν; 6.5; Fitzgerald with 
adaptations), but means trying to live both sides, finding 
the middle ground (9.8, 10.6). What better way to express 
said multiplicity than the art of expressing oneself better, 
i.e. rhetoric? 
 
Ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὤν, καὶ οὔτε θεός, ἵνα δὴ καὶ 
ἀκλινὴς εἴην πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονήν, οὔτε θηρίον, ἵνα τὰς 
σώματος ἡδοίμην ἡδονάς. λείπεται δή τι τῶν ἐν μέσῳ, τί δ’ 
ἂν εἴη πρὸ τῆς ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ περὶ λόγους διατριβῆς; τίς 
ἡδονὴ καθαρωτέρα; τίς ἀπαθεστέρα προσπάθεια; τίς ἧττον 
ἐν ὕλῃ; τίς μᾶλλον ἀμόλυντος; (8.1). 
 
For I know that I am a man, and neither a god that I should be 
adamant in face of every pleasure, nor a brute that I should take 
delight in the pleasures of the body. There remains, however, 
something to seek between these, and what can surpass a life 
spent in literature and its concerns; what pleasure is purer, what 
passionate attachment is more free from passion? (Fitzgerald). 
 
Rhetoric thus multiplies the expressive possibilities and 
allows one to express multiplicity. Furthermore, to Syn-
esius, the ars rhetorica marries perfectly with man’s am-
phibious nature as it allows him to turn to the intelligible 
world and to live in the sensible world. By beautifying 
speeches, rhetoric starts an anagogical journey leading to 
the contemplation of the intelligible (a similar journey to 
that expressed by Plato in the Symposium upon seeing 
beautiful bodies);11 yet it is also fundamental for the ‘de-
scent’ as it conveys the objects of philosophical contem-
plation and gives them a beauty which is harbinger of joy. 
Rhetoric is also an intellectual divertissement which 
would make life unbearable if it were not there: 
 
Εἰ δὲ καὶ ποικίλον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν, καμεῖται δήπου πρὸς τὴν 
ἐν θεωρίᾳ ζωήν· ὥστε ὑφήσει τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ 
καταβήσεται· οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὁ ἀκήρατος νοῦς, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἐν 
ζῴου ψυχῇ. καὶ ἡμῶν οὖν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μετιτέον τοὺς 
ἀνθρωπινωτέρους τῶν λόγων, ὑποδοχήν τινα 
μηχανωμένους κατιούσῃ τῇ φύσει·[…] ὁ γὰρ θεὸς τὴν 
ἡδονὴν περόνην ἐποίησε τῇ ψυχῇ, δι’ ἧς ἀνέχεται τὴν 
προσεδρείαν τοῦ σώματος. τοιοῦτον οὖν τὸ ἐν λόγοις 
κάλλος (6.4-5). 
 
If our human nature is a variable quality also, it will certainly 
weary of a life of contemplation, to the point of foregoing its 
greatness, and of descending; for we are not mind undefiled but 
mind in the soul of a living creature; and for our own sakes 
therefore we must seek after the more human forms of literature, 
providing a home for our nature when it descends. […] For God 
has made pleasure to be a fastening for the soul by which it sup-
ports the proximity of the body. Such then is the beauty of lit-
erature (Fitzgerald).12 
 
To Synesius, defending the cause of rhetoric does not 
only mean justifying a precise cultural model, but also 
emphasising a precise anthropological model: man is am-
phibious and multiple by nature. Exercising the art of 
words allows him to fully embody his multiple potential. 
This typically humanist sensibility by which Synesius ob-
serves man, his ontological status, as well as the creativity 
used to express himself, leads to the following question: 
in rediscovering rhetorical traditions, can his thoughts on 
rhetoric have influenced Marsilio Ficino and Pico della 
Mirandola, staunch Neoplatonist philosophers? Is it pos-
sible to determine the presence of formal correspondence, 
i.e. direct textual echoes, and/or substantial correspond-
ence, meaning the recurrence of concepts and precise 
musings?  
 
 
3. From Synesius to the Renaissance: texts and textual 
echoes 
 
Before addressing the question, we need to verify if the 
documentary witnesses confirm the circulation of Syn-
esius’ texts in 15th century Florence. We have to deter-
mine if rhetoric theories written by Synesius could be 
read by Marsilio and Pico. Therefore, it is necessary to 
focus on the circulation of the Dion as well as on the rest 
of the corpus because musings on the art of words are 
spread throughout it.13 The documentary research yields 
63 manuscripts containing the Dion: of these, 23 predate 
the 16th century and are held in Italian libraries and 7 of 
them were surely available in Florence in the 15th century. 
Out of them, 4 are Laurentian codices from the 11th-14th 
century;14 one of them, Laurentian 60.06 from the 14th 
century, contains Synesius’ essays, including the Dion, 
and 7 orations by Aelius Aristides, including the Pro 
rhetorica and the Pro quattuor viris as well as Plato’s 
Gorgias and Phaedo. The codex proves the interest of 
humanists for rhetoric as well as proving that Synesius 
was one of the authors behind this interest. The other 3 
Florentine codices are in other libraries today but, thanks 
to the annotations of the owners, we can rebuild their his-
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tory. Of these, one stands out: the Parisian codex 4453 
owned by Domenico Grimani, successively owned by 
none other than Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.15 The 
manuscripts prove the circulation of the opus in 15th cen-
tury Florence, and that it had been certainly read by Pico, 
and most probably by Marsilio, too. 
The paper will now analyse intertextuality. Pico ex-
plicitly refers to Synesius, mentioning him by name in a 
text on rhetoric, the De genere dicendi philosophorum 
epistle to Ermolao Barbaro:  
 
Profecto quod Synesius de adolescente, de oratione dici com-
mode potest, comatam orationem semper cinaedam. Quare nos 
nostram malumus, capillis hirtam, globosam, inexpeditam, quam 
cum impuritatis vel nota vel suspicione belle comatam (Garin 
1976, 810). 
 
Actually, what Synesius said about adolescence can be said 
quite fittingly of oratory: a long-haired speech is always shame-
less. That’s why we prefer ours to be shaggy, stuck together, and 
tangled rather than beautifully kempt, and either known to be or 
suspected of being filthy (Rebhorn, 60).16 
 
In this instance, Pico refers to a passage by Synesius 
(Calv. 23) which says it is inconvenient for young men to 
take care of their hair to demonstrate that it has also be-
come inconvenient for philosophers to beautify their 
speeches with rhetoric frills.17 There is one problem, 
however: Pico refers to Synesius to support exactly the 
opposite claimed by Synesius in the Dion regarding the 
relation between rhetoric and philosophy. Synesius sug-
gests a synthesis between the two, while Pico claims “the 
barbarians have had Mercury not on their tongue, but in 
their breast” (“Habuisse barbaros non in lingua sed in 
pectore Mercurium”; 808; Rebhorn, 59) and “it is praise-
worthy for us have the Muses in our minds, not on our 
lips” (“laudabile in nobis, habere Musas in animo et non 
in labris”; Garin 1976, 814; Rebhorn, 62). Pico puts forth 
the philosophos-misologos model that Synesius had tried 
to disprove.18 How does one solve this paradox?  
Pico suggests a solution in the conclusion of the letter 
and Ermolao proves he has understood the aim of his 
interlocutor when he replies.19 Indeed, Pico suggests that 
his condemnation of rhetoric is an extremely refined and 
elegant proof of eloquence (Bausi 1996, 16-20). Pico thus 
gives us an example of an antilogy, a speech which is a 
contradiction of terms and ideas. Pico thus relates to the 
Δισσοὶ λόγοι, the double speeches typical of Gorgia and 
Protagoras’ sophist tradition which prove that eloquence 
allows you to claim anything and the opposite of every-
thing: just like in this case, where eloquence has to be 
abandoned.20 Moreover, referring to Synesius represents a 
further demonstration of the very refined rhetoric game 
staged by Pico, who not only claims that in which he does 
not believe in, but to support his false condemnation uses 
models to say the exact opposite of what they normally 
say, creating a rhetorical game of diffractions and rever-
sals aiming to entertain the erudite reader. 
Despite being the only passage on explicit intertex-
tuality discussing rhetorical topics of our authors, it is 
possible to find other passages in which Synesius’ Late 
Antiquity text and the Renaissance ones by Ficino and 
Pico seem to implicitly refer to one another. One example 
is Pico’s epistle to Lorenzo the Magnificent in 1484 
which praises the form and content of Lorenzo’s compo-
sitions: Pico says he can “turn amorous lyrics into phi-
losophy and turn those lyrics which are by nature slightly 
austere into loveable moulding them into the shape of 
Venus” (“Philosophica facere quae sunt amatoria, et quae 
sunt sua severitate austerula, superinducta venere facere 
amabilia”; Garin 1976, 801; my trans.)21 To express the 
grandiosity of this marriage between eloquence and phi-
losophy, he claims that Lorenzo can soar just as Dante 
despite the fact the content and sweetness of his style, 
similar to Petrarca’s, tend to bring him down.22 Therefore, 
to Pico, Lorenzo possesses the nature of birds soaring in 
the sky and the nature of those which remain on the 
ground to sing. This image depicts the marriage between 
rhetoric and philosophy which could be reminiscent of a 
similar image used by Synesius in the Dion to talk of the 
same admirable marriage: 
 
Ἀετὸν δὲ ἅμα καὶ κύκνον γενέσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἀμφοῖν ἔχειν 
πλεονεκτήματα, ὄρνισι μὲν ἡ φύσις οὐ ξυνεχώρησεν· 
ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ἔδωκεν ὁ θεός, ὅτῳ καὶ ἔδωκε γλώττης τε εὖ 
ἥκειν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπήβολον εἶναι (11.5). 
 
To be an eagle and a swan at the same time, and to possess the 
advantages of both, nature has not granted to birds. But to man 
God has given it, granting him both success with his tongue and 
mastery over philosophy (Fitzgerald). 
 
Synesius uses this chimerical image to describe man’s ex-
ceptional nature, whose potential is fully released in the 
figure of the rhetorician-philosopher: he possesses both 
the sweet gift that are words like a swan as well as the 
skill of philosophical self-elevation like an eagle. 
 
 
4. Φαντασία and ars rhetorica: the demiurgic power 
of words 
 
To better understand the system of resonances and echoes 
of these authors it is essential to analyse theoretical mat-
ters which allow us to unveil substantial analogies, i.e. 
what connects these authors on an intimate level. The 
fundamental question is how does the ars rhetorica syn-
thesise the speculative and sensible dimension? What 
does it mean when we say that rhetoric unites man’s dif-
ferent natures and thus expresses the multiplicity of his 
nature?  
Rhetoric, besides being a spiritual exercise with an 
anagogical and catagogical function, according to Syn-
esius can also transform thoughts in images and images in 
thoughts, connecting the sensible and intelligible world. 
Rhetoric exploits sentences to create parallels and antithe-
ses, increases the expressive power of words until it trans-
forms them into verbal images. At the same time the sen-
sible world in which the rhetorician lives is elaborated 
and transformed into words: “finding words for every-
thing by his rhetorical power” (Τῇ ῥητορείᾳ παντὸς 
ἐξευρεῖν λόγους; Dion 3.8; Fitzgerald). Rhetoric is thus 
crucial insofar as it represents a creative bidirectional 
power. It is the expression of that faculty of imagination 
and lower-ranking rationality called φαντασία: 
 
Tί δ’ ἂν εἴη λόγου νῷ συγγενέστερον; τί δὲ πορθμεῖον ἐπὶ 
νοῦν οἰκειότερον; ὡς ὅπου λόγος, ἐκεῖ που καὶ νοῦς· εἰ δὲ 
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μή, πάντως τις εἴδησις, ἐν ὑστέροις νόησις οὖσα. Καὶ γὰρ 
ἐνθάδε καλοῦνταί τινες θεωρίαι καὶ θεωρήματα ἔργα 
ἐλάττονος νοῦ, ῥητορικά τε καὶ ποιητικά (Dion 8.3). 
 
Now what could be more allied to mind than speech, or what 
ferry is more suited to conduct us to mind? For wherever there is 
speech, there also, I assume, is mind and if not, a different ra-
tional knowledge of inferior order which implies intellectual 
perception. For in this connection certain processes of thinking 
and their objects get their name as works of a lesser mind, for 
example the rhetorical and poetical activity (Fitzgerald with ad-
aptations).23 
 
‘Lesser mind’ refers to φαντασία itself and the connec-
tion between φαντασία and rhetoric is the essential ele-
ment to understand the connection between Synesius and 
the Renaissance.  
Synesius describes φαντασία as the faculty allowing 
man to interact with the sensible world and, in turn, for it 
to stimulate the soul.24 Φαντασία looks towards the 
shadows of the bodies but has the function of capturing 
the original light of those very same shadows.25 How does 
φαντασία express itself? Certainly in dreams but also, as 
clearly written by Synesius, in rhetoric: 
 
Ἴδοι δ’ ἄν τις ὅσον τὸ ἔργον, ἐπιχειρήσας συμπαρατείνειν 
τὸν λόγον τοῖς φάσμασιν, ὑφ’ ὧν χωρίζεται μὲν τὰ φύσει 
συνόντα, συνάγεται δὲ τὰ φύσει κεχωρισμένα, καὶ δεῖ τῷ 
λόγῳ τὸν μὴ πεφαντασμένον φαντάσαι […] Ὅταν δὲ τῇ 
φαντασίᾳ ἐξωθῆται μὲν τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ἀντεισάγηται δὲ 
εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς μήτε ὄντα μήτε φύσιν 
ἔχοντα εἶναι, τίς μηχανὴ τοῖς οἴκοθεν ἀνεννοήτοις 
παραστῆσαι φύσιν ἀκατονόμαστον; […] ἐν οἷς ἅπασι καὶ 
τὸ διαγενέσθαι μὴ λίαν ἀσχημονοῦντα, τελειοτάτης ἂν εἴη 
ῥητορικῆς (Insomn.18.3-19.1). 
 
Anyone can see how great the work is, on attempting to fit lan-
guage to visions, visions of which those things which are united 
in nature are separated, and things separated in nature are united, 
and he is obliged to show in speech what has not been revealed. 
[…] for whenever by fantasy things which are expelled from the 
order of being, and things which never in any possible way ex-
isted, are brought into being […] what contrivance is there for 
presenting a nameless nature to things which are per se incon-
ceivable? […] To survive at all and without cutting a sorry fig-
ure amidst all this, would be proof of a masterly rhetoric (Fitz-
gerald). 
 
Synesius knows that reason has to understand what is not 
naturally discursive in the sensible and intelligible world, 
i.e. understand the limitations λόγος has in expressing 
what ἄ-λογος26 is. Therefore, rhetoric transforms that 
which does not belong to the world of words into words, 
i.e. transforms images φαντασία creates from the corpo-
ral world into words. Both processes reflect the images of 
the sensible world onto the world of logos, similarly to a 
mirror, regardless if λόγος is interpreted as ‘word’ or 
‘thought’.27 Rhetoric and φαντασία are two specular and 
corresponding cognitive processes. Rhetoric creates beau-
tiful speeches, φαντασία creates dreams. But what is a 
καλὸς λόγος, a beautiful speech, if nothing other than a 
speech with the semblance of a dream. In other words, 
rhetoric creates daydreams. 
The Stoic concept of φαντασία rather than the Pla-
tonic one is what defines φαντασία as a creative moment 
as well as its close tie to rhetoric. Plato generally treats 
imagination as a mixture of sensation and opinion that 
leads us away from the truth (Sph 260c-264a, Thaet 152a-
c); this mental capacity deals with the sensible world and 
this is the reason why it is not the more desirable form of 
cognition. Stoic philosophers, however, characterise 
φαντασία as a creative power. This capacity of the hu-
man mind is more powerful than μίμησις, imitation, be-
cause it envisions what had never been sensed, i.e. it pro-
duces something visible (artist’s products) or invisible 
(rhetorician’s speeches) which have never been experi-
enced before by the senses.28 Concomitantly, φαντασία 
is also an epistemological tool as it was for the followers 
of Platonism29 because it has to perform mental oper-
ations such as ascertaining similarity, transition, and 
composition, and then transform their results into thought 
(λόγος) and therefore into speeches (λόγοι)30. Thus, 
Stoics treat φαντασία as a fundamental human creativity, 
which allows either to envision things not previously seen 
or sensed or to elaborate sensations into mental objects.31 
Flory writes, “it seems a short jump […] to the creativity 
theories of the rhetoricians” (155). In Late Antiquity a 
slow harmonisation process of concepts from different 
philosophical schools of thought occurs;32 Neoplatonism 
tends to integrate Stoic and Peripatetic concepts in its sys-
tem, including the Stoic vision of φαντασία. In this syn-
cretist process, Synesius plays a seminal role because he 
imports and adapts the Stoic idea of φαντασία to Neopla-
tonism as well as passing on this idea to the following 
Platonism tradition.33 Therefore, he represents one of the 
crucial points of the evolution of this concept and its tra-
dition. This idea is adopted in the Renaissance by authors 
such as Pico and Ficino who bring the concept of imagi-
natio-phantasia at the heart of their thoughts and its im-
portance to the work of rhetoricians.34 
Regarding the Renaissance, the parallelisms between 
oneiric images, products of phantasia, and a rhetorician’s 
speeches found in Synesius return in Ficino and Pico. One 
starting image which ideally ferries us from Late An-
tiquity to the 15th century is the ‘heel/foot of the soul’. 
Synesius compares the pleasure awoken by reading beau-
tiful speeches, a product of the faculty of imagination, to 
the heel on which the soul can sustain the weight of the 
body (ἡδονὴ περόνη τῇ ψυχῇ; Dion 6.4). The image of 
pes animae can be found again in Ficino who uses it to 
indicate the lower part of the soul corresponding to the 
one closest to the world of sensations and images, i.e. 
phantasia (Theologia platonica XIII 2, IV 138-140)35. 
The image of the ‘foot of the soul’ is a widespread image 
in antiquity: however, most authors use it with a negative 
connotation to indicate the concupiscible part of the soul, 
therefore as a symbol of dark cupiditas36. Synesius and 
Ficino are the only ones to use this metaphor positively: 
the faculty of imagination and rhetoric are a luminous 
support on which the whole human nature rests. 
In Ficino, the parallelisms between oneiric dreams 
created by phantasia and the speeches of rhetoricians are 
analysed and problematized throughout his work and, 
specifically, in the Commentaria in Platonis Sophistam37. 
Consider the commentaries were written considerably 
later than the translation of the Platonic dialogue bearing 
the same name and are composed in a moment when Fi-
cino had read and extensively studied Neoplatonic 
authors, including Synesius38. When Ficino comments on 
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the Platonic passage where Socrates explains to 
Theaetetus what the divine and human creative act is (Pl. 
Sph. 265b-c), he focuses on the creative process of the 
divine idola described by Plato, namely on demonology. 
However, he also talks of man’s creative process: he 
writes that the divine production of imagines umbrae is 
specular to the human production of rhetoric speeches, 
beautiful yet misleading. Ficino believes man’s vis imagi-
nativa equals a semi-divine, or rather, demonic power, 
whereby man can also create simulacra just like a god. 
This creative process is defined as a “certain demonic 
contrivance” (“machinatio quaedam daemonica”; in 
Sophistam, 273.9-10; Allen 272).39 These simulacra can 
be verbal if a rhetorician or sophist creates them: assum-
ing the sensible world is a multiple and shadowy reality, 
the rhetorician creates ‘verbal shadows’, thus participat-
ing in the demiurgic process of expressing reality.40 
Therefore, even for Ficino, rhetoric is one of the manifes-
tations of imaginatio-phantasia, which elevates man to 
the status of a demigod. The rhetorician is, so to say, a 
demonic being because of his skill to imagine and create 
verbal simulacra: “what imagines in us is in some respects 
a demon” (“quod in nobis imaginatur est quodammodo 
daemon”; in Sophistam, 271.24-25; Allen, 270). In the 
conclusion to the comment, the rhetorician and sophist is 
defined as a “feigner and manipulator of phantasms” 
(“phantasmatum fictor et praestigiator”; 277.28; Allen, 
278),41 labelled as a demon using an ars quadam phantas-
ticam: 
 
Sophista circa non ens versatur in tenebris, et arte quadam phan-
tastica pollens non res quidem ipsas veras inspicit, sed simula-
chra quaedam earum apparentia fingit (in Sophistam, 231.21-
24). 
 
The sophist deals with shadows in speaking of not-being, and, 
wielding the power of phantastic art, he does not gaze upon 
things as they truly are, but fashions certain simulacra and ap-
pearances of realities (Allen, 230). 
 
Allen highlighted the significance of chapter 46 (in 
Sophistam, 271-277) because it is here that Ficino seems 
to claim that the exceptional nature of man is revealed es-
pecially by the creative power of his imagination, making 
him similar to a god.42 We find the same esteem for man 
due to his faculty of imagination in the Theologia pla-
tonica: Ficino, speaking of man’s superiority compared to 
other living beings, explains this superiority as a result of 
his fantastical skills. They allow him to master multiple 
arts thanks to which he can “imitate the creator of the 
world” (“deum naturae artificem imitari”; Theologia pla-
tonica XIII 3, IV 170-176), and he also includes the ora-
torum facundia among them. 
Even Pico, in the epistle to Ermolao Barbaro, speaks 
of rhetoric as a magical creative power of phantasm and 
simulacra: 
 
Demum res ipsas magicis quasi, quod vos iactatis, viribus elo-
quentiae, in quam libuerit faciem habitumque transformare, ut 
non qualia sunt suopte ingenio, sed qualia volueritis […] (rhe-
tor), fallacem verborum concentum, veluti larvas et simulacra 
praetendens, auditorum mentes blandiendo ludificet (Garin 
1976, 808). 
 
And finally, to transform things themselves, as if by magical 
force of eloquence, which you boast about, so that they assume 
whatever face and dress you wish, not appearing what they are 
in actuality, but what your will wants them to be. […] [The 
rhetorician] by producing the deceptive harmony of words, like 
so many masks and simulacra, it dupes the minds of your audi-
tors while it flatters them (Rebhorn, 59).  
 
Of course, we cannot forget about the Platonic condemna-
tion weighing down on the sophist for being a creator of 
speeches based on opinion, therefore deceitful.43 To say 
that Pico and especially Ficino have a positive view of the 
sophist figure would be incorrect. However, we should 
also consider that the accusation to rhetoric moved by Fi-
cino and Pico is characterised by extreme stereotypes and 
should be interpreted, especially in Pico, as a topos of 
Platonic literary tradition rather than an effective ideo-
logical and cultural sharing.44 Moreover, consider that if 
in both authors the figure of the sophist is followed by a 
shadow, the more resplendent the light of the demiurgic 
and fantastic power projected onto him, the darker the 
shadow will be. The accusation to the sophist would be 
secondary to the fascination they feel for his skill of mas-
tering imaginatio-phantasia.45 We could go as far as say-
ing that the sophist becomes important and acquires depth 
in Pico and Ficino’s work because of the shadows pro-
jected by his ars phantastica. 
The topic of rhetoricians as demon-demiurges found 
in Ficino and Pico is also found in nuce in Synesius who 
claims the following when speaking of good rhetoricians:  
 
Ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἀφανῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων 
εἰκόνας ἐμφανεῖς ὑπεστήσατο τῶν ἰδεῶν τὰ σώματα, 
οὕτως ἔχουσα κάλλος ψυχὴ καὶ γόνιμος οὖσα τῶν 
ἀρίστων, διαδόσιμον ἔχει μέχρι τῶν ἔξω τὴν δύναμιν (Dion 
5.4). 
 
Just as God has conceived clear images of his secret powers, 
tangible bodies of the ideas, thus a soul possessing beauty and 
fruitful of the noblest things, possesses the force which is trans-
missible even to things outside (Fitzgerald). 
 
The idea that the rhetorician’s labor limae is not that dis-
similar, although inferior, to the κοσμεῖν of a divinity, 
already belongs to the Synesian thought. The rhetorician 
is a model for people wishing to become, to a certain ex-
tent, similar to gods. One has to become “that person who 
knows how to use word in a multiform manner” (“Ὁ 
παντοδαπῶς ἔχων τοῦ λόγου”; Dion 5.5; my trans.). 
 
 
5. Under the sign of Proteus: anthropology between 
rhetoric and imagination 
 
We can now analyse a last, particularly important image, 
as from a theoretical and formal point of view it repre-
sents a summary and resolution to the matter: identifying 
the rhetoric and anthropological model in the figure of 
Proteus, a marine shapeshifting god with prophetic pow-
ers. He is a marine god because he is liquid: he changes 
and transforms to flee from his petitioners curious about 
their future. His ‘liquid being’ manifests more than any-
thing from his σοφιστικὴ θαυματολογία, his sophistic 
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skill of making slights of hand with words, to always ad-
apt and present himself in differing shapes: 
 
Ἄγαμαι δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸν Πρωτέα τὸν Φάριον, εἰ σοφὸς ὢν 
τὰ μεγάλα, σοφιστικήν τινα θαυματολογίαν προὐβέβλητο, 
καὶ παντοδαπῶς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι συνεγίγνετο· ᾤχοντο 
γὰρ ἂν τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν τραγῳδίαν τεθαυμακότες, ὡς μὴ 
ἐπιζητῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὧν πραγματεύοιτο (Dion 5.7). 
 
For my part I admire Proteus of Pharos also because, being wise 
in great things, he was used to show off the ability, so to speak, 
of a sophistic illusionist’s word and to always show up in a dif-
ferent guise to people who bumped into him (Fitzgerald with 
adaptations). 
 
The trait of Proteus is ποικιλία, versatility, the multi-
plicity of colours, being garish. In Greek literary tradition 
ποικιλία is, starting from Callimachus onwards, first and 
foremost linguistic versatility, a skill for mixing genres 
and styles to always create new shapes. In other words 
Synesius admires Proteus for his rhetoric skills. We could 
suggest that if Synesius’ anthropological model is Proteus 
and he, in turn, is the image of rhetoric art and, then to 
fully tap into the human nature one must cultivate the cre-
ative and demiurgic power of rhetoric.  
This marine god beloved by Synesius returns in Pico 
and Ficino and is introduced with the same words and for 
the same goals. Pico in Oratio de hominis dignitate, pub-
lished in 1486 (Bausi 2014, IX-X), uses the renowned 
metaphor of the chameleon and the analogy with Proteus 
to explain his own anthropological model: 
 
Quis hunc nostrum chamaeleonta non admiretur? […] Quem 
non immerito Asclepius Atheniensis, versipellis huius et se ip-
sam transformantis naturae argumento, per Protheum in mys-
teriis significari dixit. Hinc illae apud Hebreos et Pythagoricos 
methamorphoses celebrate (31-35, p.14). 
 
Who will not wonder at this chameleon of ours? […] Not with-
out reason, Asclepius the Athenian said that man was repre-
sented in the secret rites by Proteus because of his changing and 
metamorphous nature. Hence the metamorphoses renowned 
among the Jews and the Pythagoreans (Borghesi, 123-125). 
 
Busi (289-291) highlights the comparison with Proteus in 
Pico as unusual. Indeed, Proteus has been treated as a 
negative figure in the past, a reference to the ambiguous 
and dark aspects of a word in constant flux as well as a 
metaphor for treachery. Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Al. 
Paed. 3.1.1-4), Plutarcus (Plu. Mor. 97a), Lucian (Luc. 
Peregr. 42), and right up until Gregory of Nazianzus 
(Greg. Naz. Contra Iul. 35.585.5-11), all these authors 
have used Proteus as an allegory to the dark side of the 
human soul and its sinister inclination. Therefore, accord-
ing to Busi, characterising the polymorphic nature of the 
human soul with positive terms by using Proteus would 
be innovative for Pico, maybe, as he says, inspired by Or-
pheus’ hymns.46 However, as highlighted in this paper, 
Synesius had already attributed positive traits to Proteus, 
making him an anthropological and rhetoric paradigm. Is 
it legitimate to hypothesise that we are witnessing a Syn-
esian echo? To answer the question, we can proceed in 
the Oratio where we find three other elements confirming 
the validity of this hypothesis. First, shortly after having 
mentioned Proteus, Pico writes: “Hence that saying of 
Chaldeans […] that is, ‘Man is by nature diverse, multi-
form and inconstant’” (“Hinc illud Chaldeorum […], idest 
homo variae ac multiformis et desultoriae naturae ani-
mal”; 44, p. 20; Borghesi, 133). The text features a gap 
and the Chaldean quote Pico refers to cannot be traced.47 
However, we do know that in the Renaissance, Synesius 
was considered one of the main vessels for spreading 
Chaldean knowledge.48 Second, we find an expression in 
the Dion which is very similar both in form and meaning 
to the abovementioned quote by Pico in which man is an 
animal with a “diverse, multiform, and inconstant nature”: 
“multiform is our nature” (“ποικίλον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν”; 
Dion 6.4).49 Last, proceeding in the Oratio to the point 
mentioning the theory of cosmic sympatheia (230, p.114), 
Pico quotes a passage from Synesius’ De insomnis (2.2) 
proving Synesius is one of the models he has in mind 
when drafting the text. Therefore, why exclude that be-
hind the chameleon image in Pichian anthropology we 
could not find, even implicitly, Synesius’ anthropological 
model based on the creative and demiurgic power of rhet-
oric?  
Even Ficino uses Proteus in the comment on Priscian 
of Lydia from 1498: “Imagination is like Proteus or a 
chameleon” (“Imaginatio est tanquam Protheus vel came-
leon”; Opera, 1825; my trans.). In this case, it is not Syn-
esius who influences Ficino, rather Pico’s Oratio which 
had already been published in 1496.50 However, we notice 
a different element when comparing it to Pico: to Ficino, 
Proteus is not just an image of man, rather his imaginative 
skill.51 Imaginatio therefore becomes the distinctive trait 
of Ficino’s anthropology and, as we have clearly seen in 
the comments on the Sophist, it is closely tied to rhetoric. 
Ficino takes a further step compared to Pico in explicating 
the tie among anthropology, fantasy and rhetoric, ideally 
closing the circle opened by Synesius: Proteus is rhetori-
cian, artist, and man. Ficino, Pico, and Synesius believe 
that whoever experiments and dabbles in the creative act 
represented by imaginatio/phantasia creates a positive 
anthropological model where the skill of moving fluidly 
between light and shadow is positive and the same applies 
to freely taking on all the shapes one wishes to, especially 
if thus occurs using words;52 after all, Pico clearly states: 
“having been born into this condition; that is, born with 
the possibility to become what we wish to be” (“postquam 
hac nati sumus conditione, ut id simus quod esse volu-
mus”; Oratio 46, p. 20; Borghesi, 135). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper has yielded the following conclusions: 1) the 
manuscripts prove that Synesius’ works containing reflec-
tions on rhetoric, especially the Dion, were read by Pico 
and Ficino; 2) we can establish intertextual connections 
among these three authors in passages discussing elo-
quence; 3) Synesius characterises the rhetoric art as an 
expression of φαντασία and therefore as a positive tool 
to express man’s multiple nature; 4) even to Pico and Fi-
cino the figure of the sophist, despite being ambiguous, is 
an extraordinary individual because of his mastery of the 
fantastical art and his ability to express the multiplicity 
which dominates his nature; 4) all three authors select 
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Proteus, god of the shifting word, as an anthropological 
model due to his fantastical and rhetorical skills.  
It is not easy to quantify the significance that Synesius 
had on developing the Renaissance sensibility. After all, 
humanists approached the ancient cultural heritage with 
curiosity and eclecticism, reading whatever they could 
find on the matter back then, until they made it their own. 
The result is the development of a synthetic thought in 
which the borders between one source and the other are 
so blurred to have become indistinguishable53. The Syn-
esian formulations often refer to other sources which 
would have been accessible by humanists without neces-
sarily his intermediation. However, he shares a very simi-
lar sensibility with these authors both in terms of philo-
sophical and cultural interests, thus making him a more 
accessible author and an ideal source to tap into.54 More-
over, if the concept of phantasia inherited by Pico and 
Ficino is the result of the Late Antiquity syncretic pro-
cess, it is highly likely that it had been inherited by Syn-
esius who, as we have seen, played a main role in inte-
grating the Stoic φαντασία into the Neoplatonic system.  
Therefore, we cannot surely guarantee an influence 
among these authors but, at the same time, we cannot and 
must not exclude such a possibility. If the data from ana-
lysing intertextuality are insufficient to claim a connec-
tion in these authors, the topics they discuss and the origi-
nal and parallel way they are developed indubitably are. 
Starting from an unequivocally fragmented and stratified 
textuality we slowly obtain a coherent picture. I believe 
that we should not exclude the possibility that Synesius’ 
reflections on rhetoric, a ‘fantastic’ expression of man’s 
multiple nature, could have played a role in developing 
the Renaissance concept of eloquence so closely con-
nected to the fantastical and verbal characterisation of an-
thropology. Indeed, I believe it to be significant that the 
most evident traits of originality in Synesius feature in the 
works of these two authors. However, the suggestion of a 
relation between Synesius and rhetoric in the Renaissance 
represents a suggestion for a further research project ra-
ther than an answer to the question on the possible rela-
tion between Late Antiquity rhetoric and the Renaissance. 
To give such an answer would be impossible mostly be-
cause of the brevity of this paper, but especially because it 
would risk stiffening the writing of these authors which 
is, by nature, multiple and changeable. 
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Notes 
 
1 See Celenza 2002, 73: “Ficino, for example, often stresses how im-
portant, indeed central, Plato is in his vision of the prisca theologia; but 
many scholars, too numerous to list, have shown that Ficino’s adherence 
to Plato is far from modern.” The importance of the relation between the 
Renaissance and Late Antiquity was highlighted by Celenza 2012, 1192: 
“Ficino’s world was much closer to the world of the late ancient think-
ers, Christian and pagan, he so admired than to that of a post-Newtonian 
natural philosopher. The same could be said for other Renaissance 
thinkers, from Bruni and Biondo to Poliziano, whose lives and careers 
spanned the fifteenth century, a crucial period for the rediscovery, con-
 
 
solidation, and eventual absorption of many of Late Antiquity’s key tex-
tual monuments.” 
2 Recent critique defined this cultural climate as ‘Third Sophistry’ (Per-
not, 14). The same definition was given to the philosophical and rhetori-
cal approach many European authors share between the 15th and 16th 
century (Godard, 173-77). For a more information on the political cul-
ture of emperor Julian, see Pack.  
3 Ficino, Opera, 1968-1978. We have two versions of the translation: the 
first version defined by Ficino in a letter to Aldo Manuzio as “exemplar 
[…] mendarum plenum” is from 1488 and is contained in the codex ric-
cardianus 76, and a definite version published in 1497 in Venice which 
represents the editio princeps (Rabassini, 153-154). 
4 See also Ep. 101.9-15 where Synesius makes the character of literary 
παίγνιον explicit. 
5 For more detailed information on the work, see Treu’s comment (Treu) 
and Aujoulat’s more recent comment in the relative critical edition 
(Lamoureux, 116-138). 
6 Syn. Ep. 154.3-11: “[…] ἔφασάν µε παρανοµεῖν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, 
ἐπαΐοντα κάλλους ἐν λέξεσι καὶ ῥυθµοῦ, καὶ περὶ Ὁµήρου τι λέγειν 
ἀξιοῦντα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις σχηµάτων, ὡς δὴ τὸν 
φιλόσοφον µισολόγον εἶναι προσῆκον καὶ µόνα περιεργάζεσθαι τὰ 
δαιµόνια πράγµατα. καὶ αὐτοὶ µὲν θεωροὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ γεγονότες· ἐµὲ δὲ 
οὐ θέµις, διότι νέµω τινὰ σχολὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τῷ καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν 
καθήρασθαι καὶ τὴν γνώµην ἡδίω γενέσθαι” (“Some of those […] have 
maintained that I am faithless to philosophy, apparently because I pro-
fess grace and harmony of style, and because I venture to say something 
concerning Homer and concerning the figures of the rhetoricians. In the 
eyes of such persons one must hate literature in order to be a philoso-
pher, and must occupy himself with divine matters only. No doubt these 
men alone have become spectators of the knowable. This privilege is 
unlawful for me, for I spend some of my leisure in purifying my tongue 
and sweetening my wit” Fitzgerald). 
7 Probably even Plotinus’ formulations on apophatism as manifestation 
of reaching the goal of the philosophical journey were a disincentive to 
confide in the power of words in a Neoplatonic ambient and embrace the 
idea that it was necessary to proceed ἐπέκεινα λόγου (“Beyond the 
word”; Dion 8.5) to carry out the βίος θεωρητικός. 
8 Also see Dion 10.3-5 and Ep. 154.32. 
9 For more information see Munarini. According to the Neoplatonic 
thought, the soul is ‘one and multiple’, where unity joins it to the divine, 
while multiplicity to the sensible world. See Plot. 4.2.1.65 or 4.7.6. 
10 See for example Dion 8.1: “Ἐγὼ δὲ βουλοίµην µὲν ἂν εἶναι τῆς 
φύσεως ἡµῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς θεωρίαν ἀνατετάσθαι. ἀµηχάνου δὲ ὄντος τε καὶ 
πεφηνότος, βουλοίµην ἂν ἐν τῷ µέρει µὲν ἔχεσθαι τῶν ἀρίστων, ἐν τῷ 
µέρει δὲ κατιὼν εἰς τὴν φύσιν ἅπτεσθαί τινος εὐφροσύνης καὶ 
ἐπαλείφειν εὐθυµίᾳ τὸν βίον” (“Now I should wish it to be a property of 
our nature to be always lifted up toward contemplation; but as this is 
obviously impracticable, I should like in turn to cling to the best and 
again in turn to descend to nature, there to cleave to merriment and 
anoint life with cheerfulness” Fitzgerald). 
11 See Dion 4.2: “Ἐπεξιὼν ἅπασιν, ὅσα Μουσῶν ἑταίροις ἀνδράσιν 
ἐρραθύµηταί τε καὶ πέπαικται, πάλιν δὲ τὴν σπουδὴν ἐπιτείνων, 
ἀναβασµῷ χρήσῃ, τοῖσδέ τε καὶ ἀδελφοῖς τισι τούτων ἀναγνώσµασιν” 
(“Having gone through all things that have been dallied over and played 
with by men who were comrades of the Muses, until, I say, with in-
creased zeal you again use these and certain kindred writings as a means 
of moral ascent” Fitzgerald). See also Pl. Phdr. 264c 2-5 and Ficino in 
Phaedrum, 178 for the comparison between a beautiful speech and body 
of a living being. Also see Dion 8.5, 9.1, 10.9 and 17.2-3 for the scal-
ability of the philosophical and didactic journey started by practising 
rhetoric. Motta (2013, 29) highlighted how in late Neoplatonism reading 
Plato’s mimetic dialogues was assimilated as a real school syllabus, tak-
ing a person gradually from the visible to the invisible, from the image 
to the model. 
12 Both Synesius (Dion 11.2) and Ficino (in Phaedrum, 133) interpret 
the ‘descent’ with an unusual optimism compared to Platonic tradition; 
both use the metaphor of the restorative banquet, which is composed of 
‘Attic delicacies and poetic sides’ for Synesius and ‘nectar and ambro-
sia’ for Ficino. Both authors do not interpret the descent as a failure of 
philosophising, but as an occasion to exercise the lowest functions of 
intellect, including the faculty of imagination, i.e. rhetoric. See Allen 
1984, 163-164: “in doing so, Ficino treats the stopping more as a kind of 
climax than as an anticlimactic epilogue […] In short, it is not the ura-
nian intuitive ecstasy of the charioteer’s gazing at the intelligibles nor 
the saturnian contemplation of the intellectuals that constitutes the fig-
ure’s conclusion, but rather the jovian activity of rational providing.” 
13 Thoughts on the art of the rhetorician are disseminated in the collec-
tion of letters, the Calvitii encomium, and the De insomnis, which was 
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certainly known by Ficino, as he translated it, and by Pico, who owned a 
copy in his private library (Kibre, footnotes 492 and 731). 
14 Codd. Laur. Plut. 55.06 (XI sec.), Plut. 80.19 (XII sec.), Plut. 55.08 
(XIV sec.) and Plut. 60.06 (XIV sec.). For all information on quoted 
manuscripts see Pinakes. 
15 Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine fonds principal 4453. Out of the other 
two codices, one (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 1038) was 
owned by Janus Lascaris and arrives in Florence around 6 years before 
Ficino’s death, while the other contains all the works of Dio 
Chrysostom, Synesius’ Dion, and the margin notes to Dion by Areta 
Cesareo, belonged to Palla Strozzi and remains in Florence until his 
death in 1462 when it was transferred to the Santa Giustina library in 
Padua. 
16 Rebhorn translates cinaedam with “sodomitical”, but I believe it is 
more appropriate to translate it with “shameless” considering the con-
text. 
17 The link between the coiffed hair and a non-virile behaviour can also 
be found in Syn. Ep. 104. 
18 Pico, ad Hermolaum, in Garin 1976, 812: “Expectamus paucorum 
potius pro admiratione silentium, introspicentium penitus aliquid aut de 
naturae adytis erutum aut de caelestium, de Iovis aula ad homines ad-
ductum” (“But we do expect instead the silce that comes from the won-
der of those few who look more deeply into something, whether that 
something is extracted from the inner temple of nature or brought down 
to men from the palace of Jove” Rebhorn, 61). 
19 Pico, ad Hermolaum, in Garin 1976, 822: “Sed exercui me libenter in 
hac materia tamquam infami […] ut veluti Glauco ille apud Platonem 
iniustitiam laudat non ex iudicio, sed ut ad laudes iustitiae Socratem 
extimulet, ita ego ut concitatius eloquentiae causam a te agi audiam in 
eam licentius repugnante paulisper sensu atque natura invectus sum, 
quam si vel negligendam vel posthabendam barbaris existimarem, non 
ab illis ad eam, quod nuper feci, ad graecas litteras […] defecissem” 
(“But I have engaged myself freely in this subject, as in something dis-
reputable […] My aim has been like that of Plato’s Glaucon who praises 
injustice, not out of conviction, but to goad Socrates into praising jus-
tice. Similarly, so that I might hear you plead the cause of eloquence, I 
have inveighed against it rather boldly for a little while, though my feel-
ings and nature fought against doing so. If I thought it right for elo-
quence to be neglected by the barbarians, I would not have almost to-
tally deserted them for it -something I did recently- or for Greek letters” 
Rebhorn, 66-67). In the answer of Ermolao Barbaro see ad Ioannem 
Picum Mirandulanum, in Garin 1976, 844-846. For a detailed study on 
the epistolary exchange between Pico and Ermolao Barbaro on elo-
quence see Bausi 1998 and Grassi, 108-116. 
20 The aim of antilogic speeches in sophistry is to prove the relativity of 
all things and highlight the centrality of man who at the same time dis-
mantles absolute truths and becomes the only measure of comparison. 
For a study on ancient sophistry and its traits see Kerferd 1988. For the 
resurgence of Gorgia’s ideas in the Renaissance see MacPhail, 65-71. 
21 For a detailed study of the epistle see Bausi 1997. 
22 See Pico, ad Laurentium Medicum, in Garin 1976, 800. 
23 In this passage, it emerges that Synesius does not clear if the rhetoric 
skill belongs exclusively to the rational discursive dimension or to 
φαντασία. He does so mainly for two reasons: first, the Dion is not a 
philosophical comment where philosophical categories are systemati-
cally determined, rather a mixed genre with the main aim of backing 
rhetoric as a form of philosophical exercise; second, rhetoric moves ef-
fectively on a rational and discursive plane as well as a fantastical one 
when it transforms paratactical representations of imagination into syn-
tactical propositions. 
24 For Synesius’ concept of φαντασία see Susanetti, 14-17 and Lam-
oureux, 205-214. See also Sheppard, 201: “Phantasia occupies a key 
position at the ‘joint’ of the soul where rational and irrational meet.” 
25 Phantasia as umbra naturae aemulatrix will also be developed by 
Giordano Bruno. See Tirinnanzi, 243-292.  
26 See Insomn. 19.2: “νεανιεύεται δὲ ἡµῶν καὶ κατ’ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς 
γνώµης, ἐνδιδοῦσά τι πλέον τοῦ οἴεσθαι […] ἤδη δέ τις ἅµα καὶ νικᾷ, 
καὶ βαδίζει, καὶ ἵπταται, καὶ χωρεῖ πάντα ἡ φαντασία· πῶς δ’ ἂν λέξις 
χωρήσειε” (“Fantasy conducts itself jauntily even against our under-
standing itself, becoming the cause of something more than thought 
[…]. Now in dreams one conquers, walks, or flies simultaneously, and 
the imagination has room for it all; but how shall mere speech find room 
for it?” Fitzgerald with adaptations). 
27 Ficino writes the same; see Allen 1989, 198: “The radial images, be-
ing purely visual, can be reflected by the naturally magical power of a 
plane mirror or focussed by one that is convex or concave. The simula-
cra, however, can only be reflected or focussed in “the animate and 
phantastic spirit” (275.32), that is, in the spiritus phantasticus of Neo-
 
 
platonic pneumatology and more particularly for Ficino of Synesian 
oneirology”. 
28 See for example Philostr. VA 6.19.23-29: “φαντασία […] ταῦτα 
εἰργάσατο σοφωτέρα µιµήσεως δηµιουργός· µίµησις µὲν γὰρ 
δηµιουργήσει, ὃ εἶδεν, φαντασία δὲ καὶ ὃ µὴ εἶδεν, ὑποθήσεται γὰρ 
αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ µίµησιν µὲν πολλάκις ἐκκρούει 
ἔκπληξις, φαντασίαν δὲ οὐδέν, χωρεῖ γὰρ ἀνέκπληκτος πρὸς ὃ αὐτὴ 
ὑπέθετο” (“Phantasia […] wrought these works, a wiser and subtler 
artist by far than imitation. Imitation can only fashion what it has seen; 
phantasia what it has never seen as well. It can conceive it by referring 
to ideal reality. Imitation is often restrained by fear. Phantasy, however, 
is never limited in the production of its creation” my trans.). The main 
difference with Platonic epistemology is that the Stoic philosophy is 
fundamentally material and does not admit there is knowledge beyond 
our perception of the sensible world. Therefore, phantasia in Stoicism is 
a fundamental cognitive tool as it is directly involved in elaborating sen-
sible data and organising them in proposition-like structures, a function 
attributed to νοῦς, intellect, by the Platonism (Flory, 151). 
29 See also Flory, 158: “It was quite probably the result of Stoic-Platonic 
amalgamation, which brought out a creative feature of the human mind 
that Stoically influenced theories of knowledge required about our per-
ceptions of the world, language, and thinking in general”. See also Au-
joulat, 123: “Il est probable que les néo-platoniciens ont été influencés 
par les stoїciens dans l’élaboration du concept de phantasia.” 
30 See Longin. 15.1.3-5: “καλεῖται µὲν γὰρ κοινῶς φαντασία πᾶν τὸ 
ὁπωσοῦν ἐννόηµα γεννητικὸν λόγου παριστάµενον” (“Generally phan-
tasia is called any thought present in the mind and producing speech” 
my trans.). 
31 See Flory, 149: “phantasia as a mental capacity that allows one to 
both envision and make others aware of realms not seen; and from this 
capacity allegedly arose art, poetry, and oratory.” 
32 See Hadot for the process of harmonisation between Platonic and 
Aristotelic thoughts of the school of Alexandria, which Synesius also 
referred to. 
33 Watson, 91 claims: “The transformation of phantasia into a term for 
creative art was due to Platonic-Stoic syncretism.” For a comparison 
between Stoic φαντασία and Synesius’ see also Aujoulat, 128-132. Syn-
esius develops a typically Neoplatonic process of integration of Stoic 
elements and harmonising the two doctrines. See Brancacci, 158-160 on 
this. 
34 For the role of phantasia in relation to gnoseology and anthropology 
in Ficino and Pico, see the recent work by Fellina (9-53). For Ficino’s 
description on the functioning of phantasia, see Theologia platonica 
VIII 1, II 262-272. For the difference between the two different gnose-
ological moments constituted by phantasia and vis imaginativa see Kat-
inis 1998, 75-76 and Katinis 2002. I should highlight that Fellina (16, 
footnote 26) believes there to be no Synesian influence in the constitu-
tion of the concept of phantasia in Ficino, or that it is secondary to the 
one in Proclus. Regarding the success of the Synesian concept of 
φαντασία in the Renaissance, see for example Bruno, Opera, II, 3, p. 
220: “Synesii Platonici sententiam in medium afferamus, qui de potes-
tate phantasiae spiritusque phantastici ita disserit: in vigilia doctor est 
homo, somniantem vero Dues ipse sui participem facit” (“We hereby 
refer to the statement by Synesius the Platonist on the power of phantasy 
and the fantastic spirit. He claims: when awake man is wise, but when 
he dreams God makes him part of himself” my trans.). 
35 Ficino, based on the Platonic Timaeus and its tradition in Plotinus, 
Proclus and in the Pseudo-Dionysius, proposes the theory of the triparti-
tion of the soul: the upper part of the soul is called animae caput and is 
the part of the anima rationalis in contact with the intelligible world, i.e. 
the anima angelica or mens divina, and they both share the same onto-
logical nature. The lower part is animae pes and is in contact with the 
sensible world: it livens the body and therefore is the centre of phanta-
sia. It is also called idolum and collects material from the five sense and 
elaborates it as fantastical images. In the middle we have mens, which 
with its dianoetical process multiplies and disassembles the subjects of 
noetic contemplation and unites in blocks of meaning the images from 
the sensible world. See Kristeller, 350-368. 
36 For example Aug. Enar. in Ps 9.15 “pes animae recte […] vocatur 
cupiditas aut libido”. The negative image of the pes animae is also pres-
ent in Pico Oratio 78, p. 32: “Profecto pes animae illa est portio despica-
tissima, qua ipsa materiae tanquam terrae solo innititur: altrix - inquam - 
potestas et cibaria, fomes libidinis et voluptariae mollitudinis magistra” 
(“To be sure, the foot of the soul is that part which is most despicable, 
that which leans upon matter as if on earthly soil; it is the faculty, I say, 
that feeds and nourishes; it is, I say, the kindling wood of lust and the 
teacher of sensual weakness” Borghesi, 145). 
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37 Even in the comment to the Theaetetus (Ficino Opera, 1274), Ficino 
relates Protagorean gnoseology, and generally the rhetoric and sophist 
perspective, with the fantastic and creative activity. See Katinis 2013, 
50-51. 
38 See Allen 1989, 31: “After he had translated it between 1464 and 
1466 and written his introduction with his Proclian preface, Ficino did 
not return to the Sophist for several decades […] When he did take it up 
again in earnest towards the very end of his career, it was only after he 
had translated […] a number of important Neoplatonic treatises and 
fragments, including Iamblichus ’De mysteriis, Porphyry’s De ambsti-
nentia, Synesius’s De insomnis, and Proclus In Alcibiadem.” 
39 See also Katinis 2003. 
40 See Trinnanzi, 43: “Shadows, according to Ficino, are a knot between 
souls and bodies, and the principle allowing sensible constructs to re-
ceive and express impulses through vital acts whereby the superior pow-
ers trickle down into their inferior nature. At the same time, multiform 
traits of the explained universe germinate from the shadows: hence, in 
the comment to the Sophist, Ficino uses topics and images of Neopla-
tonic tradition to shed light on the radical shadowy element of nature.” 
41 This expression translates the Greek ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυµατοποιικόν (Pl. 
Sph. 268d 2). See also in Sophistam, 217.7: idolarum fictor. 
42 See Allen 1989, 176-177: “Ficino suggests that in us what does the 
imagining is, so to speak, a demon. […] Ficino is apparently speculating 
with the notion that we become demons in the limited sense that our 
imaginations create their own realm of images and shadows and do so 
usually independently, though on occasion they may merely replicate 
that of the demons who temporally possess them.” To know more about 
the similarity between man’s ingenium and God, the artifex, based on 
the interpretation that Ficino gives to the Platonic myth of the demiurge 
in the Timaeus, see Allen 1987.  
43 See Ficino, in Sophistam, 269.15-18: “Ars imaginaria est duplex: 
altera quidem assimilativa quae ad rei alicuius existentis exemplar ali-
quid exprimit; altera vero phantastica simulachra fingens non exis-
tentium. In genere phantastico sophista versatur et fallit” (“The imagi-
nary art is twofold. One kind is assimilative and it portrays something 
according to the model of something that actually exists. The other kind 
is phantastic and it feigns phantastic simulacra of what do not exists. 
The sophist is busy beguiling us with the phantastic kind” Allen, 268). 
For the accusation against sophists of the antiquity until the Renaissance 
see MacPhail, 45-58. 
44 Katinis (2013, 50-55) highlights that to Ficino, criticising sophistry is 
functional to highlight the analogies between Platonism and Christianity 
as opposed to the anthropocentric relativism channelled by the sophist 
thought, i.e. is part of the Platonic and Christian process of harmonisa-
tion at the heart of Ficino’s philosophy. 
45 The comparison with Ficino in Phaedrum, 168 is important: “non esse 
turpe scribere sed male scribere […] Similiter qui orationum conscrip-
tionem verbis damnant tanquam rem levem aut ambitiosam contraria 
loquuntur atque sentiunt; ipsi enim interim tanquam re praeclara mirifice 
delectantur” (“To write is not shameful in itself, only to write badly. 
[…] Similarly, those who verbally condemn the writing down of 
speeches as something frivolous or ostentatious are voicing the opposite 
of what they think and feel; for in the meantime they are wonderfully 
delighted themselves as with something excellent” Allen, 169). Even in 
his De sole IX (Opera, 992-993) Ficino invites the reader to experiment 
the potential of imagination, independently from the fact that it works 
with shadows suspended between the sensible and intelligible, as long as 
it is done consciously and usefully for the soul.  
46 See Orph. H. 25, 1-3: “Πρωτέα κικλήσκω, πόντου κληῖδας ἔχοντα, 
/πρωτογενῆ, πάσης φύσεως ἀρχὰς ὃς ἔφηνεν/ ὕλην ἀλλάσσων ἱερὴν 
ἰδέαις πολυµόρφοις.” (“I pray to Proteus, who has the keys of the sea / 
primigenial, who unveiled all the principles in nature / and transformed 
the sacred material in multiple forms”; my trans.). 
47 Maybe Orac.Chald. Fr. 106: “τολµηρᾶς φύσεως, ἄνθρωπε, 
τέχνασµα”; “O man, product of a bold nature”. See Bausi 2014, 20, 
footnote 44. Regarding the missing text and the different hypotheses on 
its content, see ibid. 241-242 and Busi, XXVII-XXX. 
48 For more information see Copenhaver. 
49 Also see Ficino, in Phaedrum, 182: “Perfectus orator scire debet ani-
mam quamlibet humanam intrinsecus esse suapte natura multiplicem 
(habere enim rationem, imaginationem, sensum, irascendi atque concu-
piscendi vires). […] Nosse preterea debet qualibus sermonibus qualia 
moveantur ingenia, et suos cuique sermones accomodare” (“The perfect 
orator must know that any human soul is intrinsically and naturally 
multiple (for it has reason, imagination, sense, and the powers of wrath 
and desire). […] Moreover, he ought to know what kind of natural dis-
positions are moved by what kind of speeches and accommodate his 
speeches to each person” Allen, 183). 
 
 
50 Even though the work was written between 1486 and 1487, it only 
circulates among Pico’s closest friends at first. It was published posthu-
mously and is part of the Bologna anthology of Pico’s works edited by 
his grandson, Gian Francesco, and published under the title Oratio 
quaedam elegantissima. See Bausi 2014, IX-XII, for information on its 
date and composition. 
51 See Katinis 2003, 93: “Ficino […] usa Proteo e il camaleonte come 
figure per descrivere non più l’uomo in modo generico, ma piuttosto la 
sua facoltà immaginativa, che diviene, quasi per proprietà transitiva, ciò 
che fa dell’uomo un essere eccezionale.” 
52 Regarding Ficino see Allen 1984, 170: “This implies a mind at odds 
with the extremer manifestations of Plato’s dualism, one drawn to envis-
aging the human condition not in the shadows of unending ἀγωνία, of 
ceaseless war between the animate prisoner and his inanimate bars, but 
rather in the light of intellect and body partaking together in a unitary 
reality”. Also see Katinis 1998, 221: “l’attività immaginativa è il veicolo 
che permette la relazione tra i due piani del composto essere umano”. 
53 See for example Petrarca, ad familiares 22.2.  
54 For example, Ficino has a better affinity with philosophers who were 
Platonists and Christian, just like Synesius, than with pagan ones, as he 
shares with them the attempt at reducing Christian doctrine and Plato’s 
thought to a synthesis (Opera, 925): “Amo equidem Platonem in Iambli-
cho, admiror in Plotino, in Dionisyio veneror” (“I love Plato in Iam-
blichus, I admire him in Plotinus, but I venerate him in Dionysius” 
Trans. Allen 1998, 67). Also see Celenza 2002, 84: “Ficino is at his 
most non-Plotinian wehn post-Plotinian Platonists presented theories 
that were more congruent with Christianity, themselves the result of 
similarities of mentality between fourth- and fifth-century Platonism and 
the Christianity of the same period. It is not just a question of sources, 
but of mentalities.” 
